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TAGS: IAEA, UN, IZ, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTORS; FURTHER STATEMENT BY IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL

1. DURING JUNE 12 IAEA BOARD DEBATE ON ISRAELI ATTACK, INDIA REQUESTED THAT DIRECTOR GENERAL EKLUND COMMENT ON PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S PRESS STATEMENT THAT ISRAELI ATTACK HAD DESTROYED A SECRET IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORY, LOCATED UNDER THE OSIRIS REACTOR, WHICH THE IAEA HAD NOT DETECTED.

2. THE TEXT OF DG EKLUND'S STATEMENT, IN WHICH EKLUND NOTES THAT IT IS NOT/NOT THE TASK OF THE AGENCY TO SEARCH FACILITIES WHICH DO NOT CONTAIN SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL, FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT: THE TASK OF THE AGENCY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS IS TO VERIFY THAT NO SAFE-

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GUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL IS DIVERTED FROM PEACEFUL PURPOSES. IN A RESEARCH REACTOR OF THE OSIRIS TYPE THIS MEANS, IN THE FIRST PLACE, TO ENSURE THAT FUEL ELEMENTS SUPPLIED FROM ABROAD ARE CHECKED ON ARRIVAL AND THAT FROM THAT MOMENT ON CONTINUITY OF KNOWLEDGE IS MAINTAINED ON THEIR LOCATION AND INTEGRITY. THE PRIMARY MEASURES USED FOR THIS PURPOSE ARE ITEM COUNTING, IDENTIFICATION, AND CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE. THE DESIGN OF THE FACILITY AND OF THE FUEL ELEMENTS IS SUCH THAT PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT THE DIVERSION OF FUEL ELEMENTS WOULD BE DETECTED WITH VERY HIGH PROBABILITY. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY OF DIVERSION IN A FACILITY OF OSIRIS TYPE IS BASED ON THE UNDECLARED PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM. AS THE FUEL ELEMENTS CONSIST OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM, ONLY VERY SMALL QUANTITIES OF PLUTONIUM CAN BE PRODUCED IN THEM. LARGER QUANTITIES PER-

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HAPS UP TO THE ORDER OF ONE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY PER YEAR COULD ONLY BE PRODUCED IF THE CORE OF THE (TAMUZ I) REACTOR WERE SURROUNDED BY A BLANKET OF FERTILE ELEMENTS MADE OF NATURAL OR DEPLETED URANIUM. THE SIZE AND LOCATION OF THIS BLANKET WOULD BE SUCH THAT ORDINARY VISUAL INSPECTION WOULD REVEAL ITS PRESENCE. THE PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM IN FERTILE ELEMENTS LOCATED UNDERNEATH THE REACTOR IS PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE SINCE THE CORE IS PLACED ON A THICK CONCRETE SLAB WHICH IN TURN IS LINED WITH A HEAVY STEEL PLATE. THESE PROVIDE SHIELDING TO PERMIT MAINTENANCE WORK ON CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVES LOCATED IN A VAULT BELOW THE REACTOR TO BE CARRIED OUT.

THE EXISTANCE OR OTEERWISE OF UNDECLARED UNDERGROUND INSTALLATIONS HAS NO INFLUENCE ON THE DETECTION CAPABILITY

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OF THE IAEA'S INSPECTORATE AT REACTORS OF THE OSIRIS TYPE. IN SUCH A TRANSPARENT POOL REACTOR THE ABSENCE OF FUEL ELEMENTS OR THE PRESENCE OF UNDECLARED FERTILE ELEMENTS FOR PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION WOULD BE EASILY DETECTED.

IN CONCLUSION, IN A REACTOR OF THIS TYPE, DIVERSION OF FUEL ELEMENTS OR OF UNDECLARED PLUTONIUM PRODUCED AT LOW RATE CANNOT BE TECHNICALLY EXCLUDED BUT WOULD BE DETECTED WITH VERY HIGH PROBABILITY.

IT SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE BORNE IN MIND THAT IT IS NOT THE TASK OF THE AGENCY TO SEARCH FACILITIES OR INSTALLATIONS WHICH DO NOT CONTAIN SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL. THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF TECHNICIANS FROM THE COUNTRY THAT SUPPLIED THE REACTOR ALSO PROVIDES AN ADDED DEGREE OF ASSURANCE. KIRK

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